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I. INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty-five years, I have taught courses in both Copyright
and Freedom of Speech. Until quite recently, these two tangentially-related
subjects have co-existed in peaceful harmony. Over the years, I have tradi-
tionally devoted about ten minutes of Copyright class time to the free speech
issue and no time at all in Freedom of Speech class to issues of copyright.
That was then; the old world has changed. Now, we have collectively be-
come embroiled in what some are calling the "copyright wars"', with the
First Amendment (specifically, freedom of speech) as one of the central bat-
tlegrounds. In 1970, two of our leading copyright scholars argued that the
internal copyright doctrines adequately reconciled copyright with freedom of
speech.2 In 1985 the Supreme Court accepted their analyses;3 as a result,
independent first amendment analysis has not played a role in copyright
cases since that time.
Still, over the past decade, the law of copyright - traditionally an arcane
and obscure specialty - has evolved into an extraordinarily controversial le-
gal arena. To a significant extent, though not exclusively, this has been
caused by the emerging clashes between copyright on the one hand and digi-
tal technology and the internet on the other. Some see copyright as the ag-
gressor in the copyright wars, guilty of threatening the digital revolution, the
internet, information policy, privacy, freedom of speech and the public do-
main.4 Much of this assault on copyright is culturally driven by the Internet's
champions. Inevitably, this cultural challenge is now duly reflected in legal
argument as well. As copyright law has generated more and more contro-
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versy, several legal scholars have come forth to challenge the traditional rec-
onciliation of copyright and freedom of speech.5
Among the aforementioned scholars, whom I will collectively refer to as
the "free speech critics", virtually all of them reject the traditional reconcilia-
tion of copyright and freedom of speech - though some do believe that the
two fields can be harmonized on other grounds. While I regard this genre of
scholarship as quite thought-provoking, to the extent that it rejects the tradi-
tional reconciliation of copyright and freedom of speech, I ultimately find it
unpersuasive. Fortunately, I am not alone; so does the United States Su-
preme Court, as well as nearly every other federal court that has had occasion
to consider the issue.
In a nutshell, my thesis is that the Court's recent opinion in Eldred v.
Ashcroft6 should properly be read as the resounding rejection of practically
all of the modem first amendment-based copyright challenges. The time has
come for the free speech critics to return to the drawing board and, if any-
thing, re-examine free speech doctrine rather than copyright. Moreover, and
contrary to recent criticism, the Court's re-endorsement of the traditional rec-
onciliation of copyright and free speech is correct, sensible, and persuasive.
II. WHY IS COPYRIGHT SO CONTROVERSIAL Now?
For most of its existence, copyright has been a relatively obscure spe-
cialty practiced by a small and somewhat isolated group of attorneys. That is
no longer the case. Today most major law firms cannot afford not to have
copyright specialists. This change is largely the result of the digital revolu-
tion. When widespread computerization, especially at the personal level,
swept the country in the early nineteen eighties, copyright began to assume
greater prominence because it was the easiest and the cheapest method of
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STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment ,48
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1057 (2001); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for
Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common with Anti-Pornography
Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000); Benkler, supra note 4, at 354; Eugene Volokh & Brett
McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copy-
right Cases, 107 YALE L. J. 2431 (1998); Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.
J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil So-
ciety, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination
and Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L. J. 1 (2002).
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obtaining legal protection for software. Then came compact disks, cd-roms,
advanced video games, the internet, dvds, mp3s and a host of other digital
technological developments of which I am unaware or have forgotten. All of
these provided new means by which copyrightable subject matter could be
exploited. Much of the underlying content was already protected by copy-
right prior to digitalization. Digitalization, especially in conjunction with the
introduction of the general public to the internet, changed the world of copy-
right in at least three very significant ways. First, it introduced valuable new
ways in which copyrighted material could be exploited. Second, it made it
possible for anyone with a computer and subsidiary equipment to make an
enormous number of perfect copies of a work inexpensively and anony-
mously. Third, it made it possible to gather, share, store and distribute infor-
mation including copyrighted works at a speed, on a scale and with an ease
and efficiency never before known. So the digital revolution presented an
extraordinary opportunity to exploit copyright as well as an enormous threat
of piracy at the same time. This resulted in the introduction of the ordinary
person to the law of copyright to an extent that had never before occurred.
Of course, most people had been utilizing copyrighted works on a daily
basis but never before had they had the opportunity to gain access to them so
readily without payment nor had they the capacity to reproduce and distribute
copyrighted works with such ease. In other words, the temptation to infringe
became all but irresistible, especially since many did not realize they were
infringing or, at the very least, could safely assume that no adverse legal
consequences would attach to their conduct. In many instances, the copy-
right owner could not care less if people copied his work. Indeed, many cop-
yright owners would be flattered that someone actually found their work
worth copying. This is hardly the case with commercially distributed en-
tertainment works such as musical recordings, movies and video games, as
well as much of the computer application software industry. There, the
threat to the copyright owner is great, and the financial stakes are high.
Moreover, widespread public use of the internet gave rise to a subcul-
ture which placed an extraordinarily high value on efficient access to and
transfer of information. This value is embodied in the popular slogan "infor-
mation wants to be free."7 The value of speedy and relatively costless trans-
fer of information is in high tension, if not outright conflict, with copyright.
Suddenly, copyright is not simply an obscure legal specialty, but rather a
serious impediment to the future of wise information policy. Copyright's
critics can easily point to an appealing villain-a wealthy, greedy soul-less
Hollywood, especially the music industry with its long standing image of
exploiting both artist and consumer. There is delicious irony in the fact that
the entertainment industry, which through its products has long championed
the courageous rebel who defies the establishment, now finds itself in the
position of the very establishment under assault by the anti-copyright rebels.
7. STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT M.I.T. 202
(1987).
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Indeed, if the critics of copyright are to put a face on the copyright world, it
would be the face of Mickey Mouse.8 Mickey has a pleasing face, at least to
four-year olds, but it is also a face that seems to represent everything that is
wrong with copyright to its critics-vast wealth and an intransigent determi-
nation to enforce intellectual property rights to the maximum. Beyond that,
the copyright on Mickey Mouse would have entered the public domain ab-
sent the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998; thus, it is often referred to
derisively by its critics as the Mickey Mouse Act.9
The copyright wars truly exploded into the public consciousness, how-
ever, with the development of mp3 digital compression technology that made
the widespread sharing of music files easy and hence, inevitable.10 Peer-to-
peer file sharing systems such as Napster appeared on the internet, and copy-
right infringement, to an extent perhaps never imagined, became common
place. Although Napster was quickly vanquished in court,11 more decentral-
ized file sharing systems which may be much more immune to legal chal-
lenge followed in the decisions wake.12
It is unfair to suggest that copyright is simply playing defense against
unfriendly critics. Two recent amendments to the Copyright Act which add
significant protection to copyright holders, have also escalated the conflict.
The first is the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), also known
as the Sonny Bono Act, which extended copyright terms by twenty years and
gave that protection to all works already in copyright as well.13 The second
is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which made it a crime
to circumvent a system designed to deny access to a copyrighted work or to
manufacture or distribute a product whose primary use is circumvention of a
technological device designed to protect a right of a copyright owner. 14 This
legislation was the entertainment industry's legal response to the threat of
widespread digital piracy of its product. First, the industry attempted to pro-
8. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 1, at 923; Benkler, supra note 4, at 21 (worrying about
"a world dominated by Disney, News Corp., and Time Warner"); Lessig, supra
note 5, at 1069 (noting that Disney would like to have perpetual protection for
Mickey but relies heavily on public domain works).
9. Yu, supra note 1, at 923.
10. Indeed, this may be the only time that a copyright issue has commanded the
cover of Newsweek.
11. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming the grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction against a peer-to-peer file sharing system).
12. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004).
13. Copyrights - Term Extension and Music Licensing Exemption Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-298, §§ 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827-28 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 304).
14. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998).
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tect its copyrighted works in digital form through encryption; but recognizing
that its encryption devices would inevitably be hacked, it obtained legal sanc-
tion against both circumvention and the manufacture and distribution of cir-
cumvention devices. Copyrights' critics lobbied intensively against each of
these amendments to the Copyright Act, but achieved little success.15
In a sense, a full-blown culture war has developed over the role of copy-
right in our legal system. A very significant subculture exists that questions
the scope and often the very propriety of copyright.16 This subculture seems
to be young, educated, and technologically skilled. The entertainment indus-
try has embarked on a massive public relations campaign designed to empha-
size the value of copyright protection.17 The industry understands that if it
loses the cultural war it will, over time, lose the legal war as well.
111. THE COPYRIGHT-FREE SPEECH CONFLICT/CONTROVERSY
However, for my purposes, this is all a prologue. I intend to focus on
the legal war. Specifically, I will focus on one aspect of the legal war: the
clash between copyright and the freedom of speech. Obviously, there is some
interface between copyright and freedom of speech. Much, though by no
means all, of what copyright protects is expression which would seem to fall
within the domain of the First Amendment. So the layperson might well
wonder why copyright protection does not violate the First Amendment. At
least since the early seventies, academics have addressed the issue of the
tension between copyright and freedom of speech. Until quite recently, the
overwhelming weight of academic authority has concluded that copyright
and freedom of speech can, in fact, coexist in harmony.18 Moreover, the
federal courts have been dismissive, if not hostile, to free speech arguments
in copyright cases. 19 Within the past five years, however, there has been a
significant outpouring of academic writing arguing that contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, the conflict between copyright and freedom of speech is se-
vere and that some aspects and applications of copyright law should be
considered unconstitutional.20
15. See Litman, supra note 4, at 122-45.
16. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 336-341 (1996) (discussing the minimalist critics of copyright).
17. See Yu, supra note 1, at 921.
18. Melville Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Robert
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Pro-
tection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979).
19. See, e.g, Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at
539; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001); A &
M Records Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004.
20. See supra note 5.
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Since most of those articles were published, First Amendment argu-
ments against copyright were rejected in two very important cases Universal
Cities Studios, Inc v. Corley2l in which the Second Circuit upheld an injunc-
tion issued under the DMCA prohibiting the posting on a web site of
software which would circumvent the DVD encryption code, and Eldred v.
Ashcroft22 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act. These two decisions hardly end
the argument over the copyright/ first amendment conflict, however, much in
the reasoning of these cases rejects many of the arguments recently set forth
by the academic critics, several of whom filed amicus briefs on behalf of the
losing parties in Corley and Eldred. As such, while it would have been very
difficult to convince a federal court three years ago that the First Amendment
placed significant limitations on copyright law, it will be even harder today.
The potential conflict between copyright and the First Amendment was
first addressed by the authors of two of the leading treatises on copyright,
Melville Nimmer23 and Paul Goldstein24 in articles in the early seventies.
Nimmer was no stranger to the First Amendment; having already written
several influential free-speech articles,25 he went on to argue and win Cohen
v. California before the United States Supreme Court.26 Essentially, Nimmer
and Goldstein contended that copyright does not raise serious First Amend-
ment problems because there are internal limitations inherent to copyright
that effectively diffuse the tension between the two areas. Specifically, Nim-
mer relied heavily on the idea/expression dichotomy, which ensures that cop-
yright protects the latter but not the former, as well as the fact that copyrights
are protected for only a limited time,27 while Goldstein emphasized a number
of doctrines including the idea/expression dichotomy, but especially fair use,
which provides a privilege for certain socially important uses of copyrighted
material.28 In addition, both authors pointed out that the very purpose of
copyright is to encourage the creation and distribution of material that con-
tributes to the public debate and storehouse of knowledge which the First
21. Corley, 273 F.3d at 429.
22. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 186.
23. Melville Nimmer, supra note 2.
24. Paul Goldstein, supra note 2.
25. See, e.g., Rodney Smolla & Melville Nimmer, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom
of Speech (2d 1990); Melville Nimmer, Is Freedom of Press a Redundancy:
What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L J 639 (1975); Mel-
ville Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment,
21 U.C.L.A. L. REV (1973); Melville Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times
to Time, First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
26. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
27. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 1189.
28. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 988.
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Amendment protects.29 Thus, a world absent of copyright would also neces-
sarily be a world significantly poorer of expressive freedom.
In the two major Supreme Court opinions addressing the copyright /free
speech tension, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. The Nation3O and, more
recently, Eldred v. Ashcroft,31 the Court strongly endorsed the idea that, in
fact, these internal copyright doctrines work together with copyright's overall
purpose and operation to diffuse the potential free speech conflict. Some
copyright critics argue that these devices provide inadequate protection to
freedom of speech.32 I disagree with them. I think that Professors Nimmer
and Goldstein and the United States Supreme Court have essentially got it
right.
There are two primary ways in which copyright might come into con-
flict with the First Amendment. Arguably, copyright might violate the First
Amendment, if copyright places off limits material that is essential to the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech. Alternatively, copyright could
also violate the First Amendment, if it prevents access to material that is in
the public domain. Those who believe that copyright and freedom of speech
are presently in conflict, tend to believe that copyright interferes with one or
both of these interests. I will examine these claims in detail. First, however,
it should be noted that the issue is not entirely open. Despite the outpouring
of claims over the past five years that copyright infringes the First Amend-
ment, just last year, a very solid majority of the Supreme Court in Eldred v.
Ashcroft clearly re-endorsed the traditional rationale for why copyright does
not present serious First Amendment problems. A broad reading of the El-
dred opinion's disposal of the copyright free speech conflict might conclude
"Game Set and Match Copyright!" That would probably be premature, in
that Eldred did not address every conceivable way in which the copyright/
free speech conflict might arise.
Eldred was a case that addressed the question of whether copyright un-
duly infringed on the public domain, specifically, by extending new as well
as existing copyright terms for an additional twenty years.3 3 The plaintiff's
strongest arguments against CTEA were based, not on the First Amendment,
but rather on the Copyright Clause itself. Specifically with respect to the
extension of existing copyrights, the plaintiffs argued that this furthered no
legitimate Copyright Clause purpose, in that there was no need to offer any
29. Nimmer, supra note 2, at 1186; Goldstein, supra note 2, at 990.
30. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 556-59.
31. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-21.
32. See, e.g., Netanel, Skein, supra note 5, at 13-37 (arguing that the idea/expres-
sion dichotomy and fair use are insufficiently protective of freedom of speech
and that the free speech benefits of copyright have been overstated); Tushnet,
supra note 5, at 8-26 (arguing that the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use
provide insufficient protection to freedom of speech).
33. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
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further incentive to these authors since the works had already been created.34
Speaking for the majority, Justice Ginsburg rejected this argument; she ex-
plained that the extension to existing copyright holders was justified as a
means of creating an incentive to restore deteriorating works, and that the
extension also provided incentives by way of harmonizing United States cop-
yright law with that of the European Union and ensuring copyright producers
and owners that they would be treated equitably when the law was revised.35
In addition, she pointed out that Congress has always given existing copy-
right holders the benefit of term limit extensions.36
Turning to the First Amendment argument, Justice Ginsburg noted that
the fact that the "Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were adopted
close in time . . . indicates that in the framer's view, copyright's limited
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles."37 Moreover, "copy-
right's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expres-
sion."38 Justice Ginsburg then explained how the idea/expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine accommodate the First Amendment.39 Finally, the
Court distinguished Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,40 a case upon
which the challengers in Eldred, as well as recent copyright critics,41 had
relied heavily. The Court pointed out that the First Amendment problem in
Turner arose because the "must carry" rules compelled speech - by forcing
persons to reproduce the speech of others - whereas copyright does not;
rather, copyright merely prevents a person from exploiting someone else's
speech.42 The Court did note that the First Amendment "bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right to make other people's speeches,"43 indicat-
ing, at least, that there could conceivably be cases in which the use of an-
other's copyrighted material would implicate the First Amendment. Despite
this concession, however, in the very next sentence the Court went on to
conclude that "to the extent such assertions raise First Amendment concerns,
copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address
them."44 While quite properly rejecting the court of appeals' conclusion,
34. Id. at 210-11.
35. Id. at 204-06.
36. Id. at 204.
37. Id. at 219.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 219-20.
40. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
41. Netanel, Skein, supra note 5, at 54-55; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 63; Benkler,
supra note 5, at 371-77.
42. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220-21.




which regarded copyright as "categorically immune from challenges under
the First Amendment,"45 it went on to say that when "Congress has not al-
tered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amend-
ment scrutiny is unnecessary."46
In its First Amendment analysis, the Eldred Court relied primarily upon
its earlier opinion in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.47 The
recent First Amendment critics of copyright could readily explain away
Harper & Row on the grounds that threats posed by copyright, as well as
First Amendment doctrine, had changed sufficiently in the two decades since
Harper & Row to significantly exacerbate the copyright/free speech con-
flict.48 Moreover, the Harper Court did not have the benefit of recent schol-
arship, which argues that copyright often does abridge freedom of speech.
Professor Lessig, one of copyright's harshest critics, who represented Eldred,
and some of the other scholars who have written that copyright raises serious
First Amendment questions, filed briefs on Eldred's behalf.49 However, the
Court simply rejected this argument.50 The Eldred Court's strong reaffirma-
tion of the traditional resolution of the copyright/free speech tension should
come as a devastating blow to those who have argued that the Court should
take a fresh look at the problem and reconsider existing doctrine. Absent any
significant legislative change that would qualify as an alteration of "the tradi-
tional contours of copyright protection,"51 which the DMCA may well be, the
Court has served notice that it and the lower federal courts will resolve any
tension between speech and copyright as they have in the past, through the
internal safeguards of copyright: the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use.
IV. ELDRED WAS CORRECT
The Eldred Court was correct in concluding that the combination of the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use remains a more than adequate means
of protecting free speech against abridgment by copyright in the run of the
mill case. Arguably, the enactment of the DMCA constitutes the type of
alteration in the "traditional contours of copyright" that requires First
Amendment scrutiny; however, even there the threat to freedom of speech is
not obviously severe. It should be remembered that providing copyright pro-
tection almost certainly results in a net increase-usually a significant net
45. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220-21.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 539.
48. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 5, at 5; Lessig, supra note 5, at 1069-70.
49. See, e.g., Brief of Jack M. Balkin, Yochai Benkler, Burt Neuborne, Robert
Post, and Jed Rubenfeld as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19.
51. Id. at 221.
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increase-in the amount of expressive material that is produced and made
available to recipients either free of charge or for an affordable fee. First
Amendment challenges to copyright generally come in two different forms.
One challenge is that even with the idea/expression dichotomy and the appli-
cation of fair use, copyright precludes a person from using material for ex-
pressive purposes where the First Amendment should permit such use.
Second, copyright might be challenged on First Amendment grounds to the
extent it precludes material from falling into the public domain or allows
copyright holders to protect much material.
A. Should There Be a First Amendment Right to Use Copyrighted
Expression.. .At Least Sometimes?
As noted earlier, one common argument for greater First Amendment
scrutiny of copyright centers around the case in which a potential speaker
claims that he or she needs to copy, distribute, or display the copyrighted
work of another in order to adequately exercise the constitutional right of
freedom of speech.52 The potential liability and threat to freedom of speech
by copyrighted material is de minimis for several reasons. First, the over-
whelming amount of such usage goes undetected. No doubt thousands of
time a day, someone e-mails a newspaper column to a friend or posts a car-
toon on a traditional bulletin board or web site. Either of these acts would
technically violate copyright, but would rarely come to the copyright owner's
attention. However, if it were brought to their attention, most copyright own-
ers would not object either because they would be flattered that someone
concluded that their work was worth utilizing, would be content that they had
already been adequately compensated for creation of the work, would con-
sent to the non-commercial use, or would consider enforcement to be too
much trouble. Thus, a great deal of copyrighted work is commonly used by
others without any real threat of liability. That is not to say that the potential
of liability is irrelevant. Some people will be deterred from using copyrighted
material out of legal concerns, especially if they work for an organization
that has adopted an intellectual property policy. Of course, others that make
small scale, non-commercial use of the copyrighted material will occasion-
ally be sued.
From a First Amendment perspective however, the question is not
whether it is convenient to use someone else's copyrighted material to make
a point. Rather, the question is whether it is necessary and whether, despite
copyright, it is still legally permissible. This is where the internal copyright
doctrines of idea/expression dichotomy and fair use come into play. As Pro-
fessor Nimmer argued over thirty years ago, it is the exception rather than the
rule where someone needs to employ the expression of another as opposed to
52. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 5, at 15-16; see also Tushnet, supra note 5, at 8-
16 (arguing that there may be cases in which a speaker needs to use the copy-
righted speech of another to make his or her point).
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the ideas, in order to adequately make a point.53 Nimmer identified certain
newsworthy pictures as an example, citing the Zapruder film of the Kennedy
assassination as well as photographs of the My Lai massacre.5 4 This calls up
the old adage that one picture is worth a thousand words and prompted Pro-
fessor Nimmer to argue that perhaps there should be a news photo exception
to copyright liability.55 If the underlying idea is not conveyed adequately
without the use of a copyrighted photograph and there exists a significant
social reason why the idea should be conveyed, fair use properly understood
should be adequate to fill the gap. Nimmer didn't believe this would be the
case because he did not think fair use should apply where there was clear,
commercial harm to the copyright owner.56 The codification of the fair use
doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 10757 clearly rejects this reading of fair use as does
subsequent Supreme Court precedent,58 which emphasizes that commercial
harm is only one factor in the fair use equation and not necessarily outcome
determinative.
How often will it be necessary for someone to use the copyrighted ex-
pression of someone else to adequately exercise First Amendment rights?
Certainly occasional quotes will be justified either as de minimis or fair use
and should not present a problem. As a general rule it should follow that the
lengthier the copyrighted work, the easier it should be to rewrite without
sacrificing the underlying idea. While most of us are unable to turn a phrase
nearly as well as George F. Will or Maureen Dowd, the First Amendment has
not been interpreted to demand that speakers are entitled to the best or most
effective means of expression.59 Free speech, though a very important right,
has always been balanced against other rights and significant societal inter-
ests. Occasionally, the argument is made that some quality of a writer, be it
manipulation,60 hatefulness61 or stylistic brilliance62 cannot adequately be
53. Nimmer, supra note at 2, at 1192.
54. Id. at 1197-1200.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1200-01.
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing the four primary fair use factors, including
harm to the copyright holder).
58. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584-86, 593-94 (1994)
(holding that commercial nature of use does not raise a presumption against fair
use and noting plaintiff's harm as only one of many factors to consider).
59. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (noting
that the First Amendment precludes any statutory right to publicly reply to
critical editorials); see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1972) (noting that there is no First Amendment-based right of
network television access).
60. See New Era Publ'ns Int'l ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990) (denying fair use where it was ar-
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captured other than by lengthy verbatim quotation.63 As a factual matter,
these claims are open to serious question. It is not at all obvious that the user
of the copyrighted material, within the boundaries of quotation and para-
phrase permitted by fair use, could not convey the essence of the copyrighted
work without infringing. At the very least, those instances in which this is
not the case are almost certainly the rare exception rather than the rule. Fair
use properly applied should ordinarily protect most, if not all, such instances.
Free speech critics64 of copyright often cite Cohen v. California for the
proposition that words are not interchangeable and that they often have emo-
tive as well as cognitive significance.65 Cohen is a very significant free
speech opinion. In Cohen, the Supreme Court invalidated a California law
which was applied to punish the plaintiff for wearing a jacket bearing the
words "Fuck the Draft."66 While the Cohen Court's conclusions that words
are not fungible remains true and important, the case clearly cannot stand for
the proposition that a speaker has unlimited discretion to choose whatever
language he desires (including the use of copyrighted work) to convey his
message. Free speech case law in the areas of campaign finance,67 broadcast
regulation,68 defamation69 and obscenity70 illustrate that a speaker is not
gued that extensive quotations from an author's diary were necessary to illus-
trate his devious nature).
61. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ'g Co., 28 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1939)
(finding fair use did not permit verbatim translation of Hitler's Mein Kempf).
62. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. year), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987) (holding that fair use does not cover lengthy quotations when
used in order to capture famous author's literary style).
63. See Netanel, supra note 5, at 14-22 for the argument that the rejection of fair
use in these cases should have raised serious First Amendment questions.
64. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 5, at 897; Tushnet, supra note 5, at 8; Ruberfeld,
supra note 5, at 14-15.
65. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
66. Id. at 16.
67. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (finding that federal election law
could regulate, and in some instance prohibit, "express advocacy" of a candi-
date such as "Vote for Candidate X", but could not regulate general-issue advo-
cacy in the absence of those "Magic words").
68. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 776 (1978) (finding an FCC broadcast
licensee could be sanctioned for broadcasting comedy recording containing in-
decent language).
69. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 392-93 (1976) (holding that a de-
fendant may be held liable for defamatory speech, but only upon showing proof
of fault).
70. Miller v. California, 414 U.S. 15, 43 (1973) (finding that criminal punishment
may be imposed for speech that is legally considered to be obscene).
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completely free to choose whatever language best conveys his message when
doing so flies in the face of a substantial or compelling state interest. Protec-
tion of copyrighted material is just such an interest.
The idea/expression dichotomy has been attacked on the ground that it
is simply too vague and uncertain to provide adequate protection of freedom
of speech where clarity and fair notice are prized.v1 The "void for vague-
ness" doctrine itself applies exclusively to criminal prosecutions72 and is
rarely the case in copyright. It is true that the line between idea and expres-
sion is notoriously indeterminate. However, the line between protected and
unprotected speech does, in fact, sometimes turn on whether or not speech
falls on one side or the other of the line that is imprecise at the margin.
Obscenity73 and indecent speech74 are two examples. Even so, if the idea/
expression dichotomy were the only buffer that copyright provided between
protected speech and liability for infringement, then perhaps the uncertainty
of the standard would in fact raise legitimate constitutional concerns. But it
must not be forgotten that in those instances in which it has been established
that a defendant did use the copyright owner's protected expression, rather
than merely his ideas, the fair use defense will almost inevitably provide a
second line of defense. I have argued that Professor Nimmer and the Su-
preme Court are correct in believing that the idea/expression dichotomy goes
a long way toward obviating any free speech problems presented by copy-
right's restriction on the use of protected expression without consent of the
copyright owner. That, of course, is only half of the equation. If anything,
the back stop of the fair use doctrine is even more significant in ensuring that
copyright law does not trample free speech values. Fair use, a judicially-
developed doctrine now legislatively incorporated in section 107 of the 1976
Copyright Act, was explicitly designed to ensure that, in many instances,
members of the public have the right to use copyrighted material without the
consent of its owner in cases of socially-beneficial purposes. The values
protected by fair use are, to a very significant extent, the same or similar to
those values that are also protected by the First Amendment.
At the outset, section 107 states that the fair use doctrine is especially
protective of uses made for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching ... scholarship or research."75 These are types of uses that
clearly are highly valued by freedom of speech as well. Section 107 then
lists four factors to weigh when determining whether a specific use of copy-
righted work is fair: (1) the nature of the copyrighted work, (2) the purpose
of the use, (3) the amount of the work used, and (4) the harm suffered by the
71. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 5, at 2445-52; Tushnet, supra note 5, at
20-24; Yen, supra note 5, at 675-76.
72. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 353, 357 (1983).
73. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
74. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 735, 737-38.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
2004]
Computer Law Review and Technology Journal
copyright owner.76 A careful application of these factors will usually do the
work to serve any purposes that an independent First Amendment analysis
would accomplish. Works of a factual nature, for instance, where there
would be a high First Amendment interest in access to the information, will
be more readily subject to fair use.7 7 A use that is for purposes of research,
criticism, informing the public or productive scholarship will also be more
likely to support the fair use defense.78 As noted above, the First Amend-
ment interest in using a large portion of a work will generally be weaker than
in using selected excerpts, and the fair use doctrine recognizes this as well.79
Finally, the fair use doctrine recognizes that a use which poses little, if any,
harm to the copyright owner will often be considered fair.80 This recognizes
that the value of freedom of information should usually prevail when there is
little harm to the interest protected by copyright.
Carefully applying the fair use doctrine - with the remembrance that it
is meant to be applied in such a way as to accommodate free speech values to
the extent possible - should greatly diffuse the tension between copyright
and freedom of speech.81 That is not to say that fair use is a mirror image of
the First Amendment. Indeed, it is not. Admittedly, there certainly could be
cases in which a fair use defense would be rejected while a First Amendment
defense might provide protection.82 However, they are likely to be few. Free
speech copyright critics often cite a handful of cases in which they argue that
the fair use defense failed, but a First Amendment defense would have or
should have succeeded.83
76. Id.
77. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 563 (recognizing a greater fair use
privilege with respect to factual works while rejecting a finding of fair use on
the facts of the case).
78. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 (noting a greater likelihood of finding fair use in
cases of transformative use). But see, Rubenfeld, supra note 5, at 16-17 for the
argument that the First Amendment disapproves of differentiating between dif-
ferent types of speech based on content.
79. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 565 (holding that the fact alone
that a work's substantial portion was copied is evidence of work's qualitative
value, to both the originator as well as the copier).
80. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (holding
that, generally, plaintiff must show some type of harm in order to successfully
defeat a fair use defense).
81. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (11 th Cir.
2001) (recognizing, quite explicitly, the need to remain "cognizant of [the free-
speech] protections [that are] interwoven into copyright law").
82. See Robert Denicola, supra note 2, at 316.
83. Netanel, supra note 5, at 81 (citing two cases where a First Amendment de-
fense might have provided protection, although fair use did not); Yen, Aggres-
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With regard to that handful of "fair use failure" cases, I disagree that a
case-by-case First Amendment backstop is warranted, at least merely by vir-
tue of the cases' existence. Truthfully, in some of these cases the fair use
defense was properly rejected, and had a First Amendment defense been
presented (assuming, of course, that one was actually available), it, too,
should have likewise failed under the facts of the cases in question.84 In
other words, the First Amendment interest is simply not as strong as it is
claimed to be. In other instances, the fair use defense was improperly re-
jected.85 Thus, the problem lies not with the inadequacy of fair use but
rather, simple recognition that with the occasional erroneous application of
the fair use doctrine, or for that matter any other legal test, doctrine or de-
fense, including a fair use (or for that matter First Amendment) defense, will
be erroneously applied on occasion. This absence of perfection in adjudica-
tion hardly justifies rejecting or even rewriting the fair use doctrine.
But assuming that there are at least a few such cases in which a First
Amendment defense would have provided better protection than the fair use
doctrine, the question then becomes whether it would be worth engrafting
such a defense into copyright in order to ensure that even these cases are
decided "correctly". I do not believe that the small number of cases that
might be decided differently would merit the cost of significantly increasing
the difficulty of doctrinal analysis in the area. Presently, the Court has re-
solved the tension between copyright and free speech with a systemic ap-
proach. That is, instead of applying free speech principles in copyright cases
sive Copyright, supra note 5, at 692-94 (discussing "Seinfeld aptitude test"
case).
84. Professor Yen relies heavily on Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998) involving a Seinfeld Aptitude Test.
Yen, supra note 5, at 675, 694. He characterizes this as an aggressive copy-
right claim warranting a First Amendment defense. Id. The Second Circuit
found upheld the finding of infringement as well as the rejection of the fair use
defense. It noted that "free speech, and public interest considerations are of
little relevance in this case, which concerns garden-variety infringement ..... "
Castle Rock Entm't, Inc., 150 F.3d at 146. I could not agree more. The case
involved blatant infringement-a very weak and unpersuasive claim for a fair
use defense. Like the court I am simply baffled by the claim that this case
presented any colorable free speech interest.
85. The case most heavily relied on by Netaniel involves a parody of Gone with the
Wind. Neil Netanel, Skein supra note 5, at 82. At the time of his article, the
Eleventh Circuit had vacated a preliminary injunction against the parody of
Gone with the Wind using a First Amendment analysis, suggesting perhaps that
the First Amendment filled an important gap in the copyright system. Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 252 F.3d 1165 (11 th Cir. 2001). However, the
court later issued a revised opinion that reached the same result, but with a very
conventional fair use analysis. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d
1257 (1 1th Cir. 2001). Consequently, First Amendment analysis was wholly
unnecessary to resolve the issue favorably to the defendant.
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on a case-by-case basis, the Court has acknowledged that in the overall big
picture, copyright promotes rather than discourages free speech - and that
copyright has its own, relatively effective internal checks that serve much the
same purpose as a separate First Amendment analysis. The Court has con-
cluded, that, as a general matter, copyright and freedom of speech are consis-
tent; it is simply not a worthwhile endeavor to undertake to inject a First
Amendment defense into every potential infringement case, even given the
rare instances in which it might make a difference. This is a wise decision.
One of the reasons why in recent years, the claim has been made that
there is more of a tension between copyright and free speech than has previ-
ously been acknowledged is because over the past few decades, free speech
doctrine has become increasingly complicated and, arguably, significantly
less coherent than it used to be.86 If this is true, and I believe that most free
speech scholars would agree that it is, two conclusions follow from it. One is
that it will be easier to find a copyright/free speech conflict because it is not
as difficult to find some strand of free speech doctrine that, if taken out of
context, will arguably take you where you want to go. Indeed, in Eldred, the
challengers made just such an argument.87 In that case, petitioners attempted
to argue that one interpretation of the Court's decision in Turner v. FCC
(upholding rules that required cable systems to carry local over the air broad-
cast stations), stood for the proposition that any legal regime which allocated
speech rights was necessarily subject to a First Amendment review.88 As
noted above, the Court readily concluded that this was a clear misreading of
the Turner opinion.89 It is evidence, however, that given the complexity of
modem free speech doctrine, it is not difficult for a clever lawyer to find
some First Amendment dicta which at least arguably subjects well-settled
copyright doctrine to challenge.
The second conclusion to follow from the aforementioned and widely-
accepted notion that free speech doctrine has evolved in complexity is this:
requiring or even encouraging the federal courts to work through such com-
plicated and difficult First Amendment theory and related defenses in order
to merely resolve garden-variety copyright cases would impose significant
costs on the copyright system - increasing the costs of litigation while yield-
ing little, if any, benefit in terms of producing different and more speech-
protective results. Moreover, in doing so, courts might even ultimately un-
dermine free-speech values in the long run; as-is, the copyright system is
intended to - and almost certainly does - promote free speech since it en-
86. See Fred Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982
Sup. Ct. Rev. 285 (describing the growing doctrinal complexity of free speech
law).
87. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003).
88. Turner v. FCC, 522 U.S. 622 (1994) (upholding rules that required cable sys-
tems to carry local over the air broadcast stations).
89. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220-21.
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courages the people to produce expressive material. Thus, despite recent ar-
guments that the free speech doctrine should be interpreted to place a check
on copyright, there is no reason to believe that the ordinary enforcement of
copyright law poses any significant threat to free speech values. Conse-
quently, the Court is correct in concluding that the internal copyright doc-
trines of both idea/expression dichotomy and fair use provide sufficient
protection to free speech values.
B. Does Copyright Law Intrude upon the free Public Domain in
Violation of the First Amendment?
Even if the enforcement of copyright law with respect to legitimately
copyrighted material does not infringe the First Amendment, the question
still remains of whether extension of copyright law into the pre-existing pub-
lic domain should raise serious First Amendment questions. This issue might
arise in at least two different contexts: (1) copyright term extension and (2)
"fencing-off" portions of the public domain with encryption technology. The
first and easiest issue is the situation - presented in Eldred v. Ashcroft -
when Congress extended the length of copyright terms, thereby preventing
material from entering the public domain as soon as it would have before the
term's extension. From a First Amendment perspective, it should not make
much difference whether the copyright term is extended with respect to ex-
isting or future copyrights. This is because, in either case, the public is de-
prived of the full use of the material for an additional period of time. In
Eldred, the strongest argument against a twenty-year extension, based on the
Copyright Clause rather than the First Amendment, asserted that there was
no legitimate Copyright Clause interest in such an extension to pre-existing
works since copyright should properly be viewed as an incentive for the
creation of new works and, by definition, no further incentive was needed
since the works had already been created.9091 The Supreme Court properly
rejected this argument finding that the extension served several legitimate
copyright interests including providing an incentive for the preservation of
deteriorating works, harmonizing United States law with that of the European
Union, and, as a matter of fairness, providing existing copyright holders with
the same benefits extended to new copyright holders.92 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that granting the extension to those already in copyright was
quite consistent with historical practice.93 The well accepted test for consti-
tutionality of an exercise of Congressional power, especially with respect to
the type of line drawing inquiry before the Court in Eldred, was simply
whether the congressional action in question was rationally related to a legiti-
90. Id. at 211.
91. Id. at 211.
92. Id. at 204-08.
93. Id. at 194-95, 204.
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mate interest.94 By a 7-2 margin, the Court found in Eldred that the test was
readily met.95
The value of convincing the Court to recognize a First Amendment in-
terest in this case would have been to step up the standard of review to the
intermediate level in the hopes that the congressional justification would be
insufficient. For the reasons described earlier,96 the Court declined to apply
First Amendment principles to what it viewed as a historically routine exten-
sion of the length of the copyright term.
The challengers in Eldred also argued that Congress could extend copy-
rights indefinitely by simply adding an additional term of years whenever
existing copyrights were about to expire. Thus, ultimately depriving the pub-
lic of its share of the traditional copyright bargain by precluding copyrighted
works from ever entering the public domain.97 If in twenty years Congress,
chooses to further extend existing copyrights, it is difficult to believe that the
Court will give Congress the degree of deference recently extended in El-
dred. Were Congress to proceed with such a course of conduct, presumably
the interest in ensuring that copyrighted material eventually became freely
available to the public would be worthy of First Amendment protection. Fur-
thermore, Eldred notwithstanding, any attempt to extend copyright perpetu-
ally would certainly be invalidated under the limited times provision of the
Copyright Clause.98
The other means by which Congress could infringe on the public do-
main and indeed the practice which has received the most withering criticism
of all, is by allowing copyright holders to arguably fence off portions of the
existing public domain through the device of encryption backed by legally
enforceable anti-circumvention prohibitions as embodied in the DMCA. 99
The digital revolution has produced opportunities as well as severe threats to
copyright. Digitalization combined with the internet produces an enormous
new market for the presentation and distribution of copyrighted work, espe-
cially music and movies. However, it also presents perhaps the most serious
threat of piracy ever faced by copyright since digital copies of pristine qual-
ity can be made and distributed anonymously, instantaneously, and in ex-
treme numbers. Copyright's critics, as well as its defenders, fully realize
this. The question that divides them so bitterly is what to make of it and
what, if anything, to do about it. Copyright content owners, especially the
music and motion picture industries, argue that unless some effective protec-
tion against digital piracy is provided, the impact will be financially devastat-
94. Id. at 204-05.
95. Eldred, 537 at 186.
96. See supra notes supra 33-51 and accompanying text.
97. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).
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ing.100 Critics of the DMCA tend to down play the impact of digital piracy
on content based industries and, instead, focus on the extent to which legal
prohibition of anti-circumvention and the manufacture or distribution of anti-
circumvention technology will allow copyright owners to unfairly extend
their monopolies by enclosing portions of the public domain to the great
detriment of the public.O1
The DMCA is not a perfect solution. Arguably, it needs to be more
flexible with greater provision for legitimate public access to encrypted
works.102 However, it simply cannot be assessed in the abstract. The DMCA
is an admittedly strong measure, but it was developed in response to an ex-
traordinary threat. The impact of digital piracy on the recorded music indus-
try has been well documented.103 Absent vigorous legal remedies against
technological circumvention, the impact on the motion picture industry could
be quite severe as well. The same may be said of other industries including
computer programs and games which are distributed in digital form. Never
before have content owners faced this type of threat of instantaneous, pristine
quality, anonymous, mass scale piracy. To respond to this threat by simply
suggesting that copyright owners should adopt some different marketing
model is hardly an alternative at all since the threat remains enormous as
long as a copy of the work is available in digital format.
Still, on the other hand, copyright owners ought not to be able to use
anti-circumvention technology and the legal enforcement system behind it to
deny access to material that is in the public domain, at least to the extent that
there is no alternative means of access to the material. If that turns out to be
the case to any significant extent, then there may be a need for some legal
counter balance whether through amendment to the DMCA providing for
additional protection for some types of circumvention including possibly the
application of the fair use doctrine or failing that, possibly the application of
First Amendment principles. So far, it is not obvious that the DMCA poses a
significant threat of locking up a great amount of public domain information
that is not otherwise available or easily discoverable.
100. See, e.g., Peter Yu, supra note 1, at 907 (stating that "[e]very year, the industry
loses billions of dollars in revenue and faces the potential loss of hundreds of
thousands of jobs."); Tim Burt, Creative Business-Download at Your Peril,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at 24 (stating that music sales fell 9-10 % globally
and the music industry lost five billion dollars due to on-line piracy in 2002);
David Lieberman, How Dangerous Are Pirates? Music Industry Blames Dying
Sales on Copying, USA TODAY, Apr. 5, 2002, at B 1 (recording industry re-
ported that it lost $4.5 billion in sales to on-line music sharing in 2001);.
101. See, e.g, Jessica Litman, supra note 4, at 29-30; Benkler, supra note 5, at 355-
58; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why
the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L. J. 519, 524 (1999).
102. See Samuelson, supra note 98, at 537-46.
103. See supra note 94.
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To begin with, anti-circumvention technology will generally only pro-
tect information made available in digital form. Even as we enter the digital
future, it is still almost certainly the case that the overwhelming amount of
copyrighted information is not initially produced or distributed in digital
form. More importantly, the DMCA only has the potential to fence off pub-
lic domain material which is available exclusively in digital format. Thus, to
the extent that a work is also available in a non-digital format such as a
newspaper, analog tape, motion picture on film or videotape, painting in a
gallery, etc., access to public domain material within the work will not be
blocked by encryption backed by the DMCA's legal sanctions. Just as a
large percentage of copyrighted works is made available in digital format,
another large portion of those works that are available are not exclusively
available in digital format. Even with respect to the works that are made
available exclusively in digital format, it is unlikely that most of these will be
protected by encryption either because it is not cost justified or because the
owner does not care whether or not the work is copied. So, it should not be
forgotten that the universe of works to which the DMCA effectively prevents
access is likely to be a very small segment of copyrighted work, that is, work
that has significant commercial value and is likely to be illegally copied and
distributed on a large scale basis. This is not to say that there is no reason to
be concerned that public access is being denied to public domain material
contained in this category of copyrighted work, but we should be clear as to
the limited scope of the threat posed by the DMCA. Even within this cate-
gory, it is important to understand why material within a copyrighted work
might be in the public domain. If it is within the public domain because it
was originally created prior to the Copyright Act or because it was copy-
righted but the copyright has expired, access to the work can almost certainly
be obtained independent of the encrypted work. If the material in question
falls within the public domain because it is trite or unoriginal, it can probably
be readily recreated without access to the encrypted work.
Arguably the most serious threat of enclosure posed by the DMCA is
with respect to idea, process, structure, or systems embodied in digital code
that is neither patentable nor copyrightable. To the extent that access to such
material is necessary or highly useful in advancing technological develop-
ment and to the extent that a significant amount of it is being completely
withheld from public access by the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA, then in the absence of statutory amendment, a case for a First
Amendment right of access might be made, at least to the extent that it could
be crafted in such a manner as to avoid creating a loop hole for large scale
commercial piracy. As of yet, however, the factual justification for the neces-
sity of such a right has not been satisfactorily established.
If this factual predicate is established, Eldred would not necessarily
stand as a bar to the application of First Amendment principles in that the
DMCA almost certainly would fall into the exception noted by the Court in
Eldred of a law in which Congress has "altered the traditional contours of
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copyright."104 By its own terms, a violation of the DMCA is not infringe-
ment of copyright.105 Moreover, traditional copyright law has never pro-
tected against anti-circumvention. The Supreme Court is obviously aware of
the DMCA, and it almost certainly added this particular caveat to its general
rejection of First Amendment analysis of copyright issues with the DMCA in
mind. Consequently, possible enclosure of public domain material is the one
area where it may still be possible to raise a First Amendment defense in the
copyright domain after Eldred, at least on the right record. Indeed, in Uni-
versal City Studios v. CorleylO6 (a pre-Eldred decision), the Second Circuit
analyzed the issuance of an injunction against the posting of anti-encryption
code on a website and ultimately rejected the First Amendment defense; the
appeals court based its decision on the fact that the regulation was content-
neutral and the effect on the speech component was merely incidental - thus
failing to burden "substantially more speech than necessary to further the
government's interests."107
CONCLUSION
As scholars like Nimmer and Goldstein recognized some thirty years
ago, the conflict between copyright and free speech is more of a case of
perception over reality. Copyright's speech-enhancement, taken together
with the companion checks of idea/expression dichotomy and fair use - all
inherent in copyright law - fundamentally relieves any real, intrinsic tension
between the two areas of the law. The Supreme Court initially recognized
this in Harper & Row and, despite a recent burst of academic criticism, cor-
rectly reaffirmed this principle understanding in Eldred. With the possible
exception of DMCA challenges, it is quite unlikely that federal courts will
begin to engage in First Amendment analyses of copyright issues within at
least the foreseeable future; happily, it is equally true that freedom of speech
will not suffer because of it.
104. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (1999).
106. Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
107. Id. at 454-55.
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